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Liability of Directors and Officers
Under FIRREA: The Uncertain
Standard of § 1821(k) and the
Need for Congressional Reform
INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),' Congress began what is certain
to be a long and expensive resolution of the savings and loan association
("S&L") crisis? As most taxpayers are well aware, the original estimates
of a $100 billion cleanup have long been abandoned, and now some
forecasters anticipate that the total cost of the S&L bailout will reach $1
trillion.3 This amount includes the 743 failed thrifts4 the government
seized in order to protect over 22 million depositors.5
One source that Congress intends to tap for a contribution to this
costly cleanup is the group that many feel is largely responsible for the
crisis in the first place - the officers and directors of the failed S&Ls.
Under § 1821(k) of FIRREA, the government may hold officers and
directors of federally insured financial institutions personally liable for
mismanagement.6 However, the language of § 1821(k) is ambiguous
, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.).
' The provisions of FIRREA apply to all FDIC-insured institutions, including banks
and S&Ls, 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (Supp. V 1993), and references to S&L officers and
directors should be considered equally applicable to bank officers and directors.
The FDIC "insure[s] ... the deposits of all banks and savings associations." 12
U.S.C. § 1811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3 Banning K. Lary, Apres le Deluge: Cleaning up After the S&L Mess, MGMT. REV.,
July 1990, at 24, 24 ("S&L clean-up estimates have swelled from $100 billion to over
$300 billion, climbing toward the $1 trillion mark that some cynics say will ultimately
be the tab for American taxpayers."). But see Birge Watkins, Examining the Past and
Present of the RTC, NAT'L REAL EST. INvESTOR, June 1994, at 138, 138 ("[Tihe cost of
the savings and loan crisis will be much less than some early estimates.").
4 Although the term 'thrifis" may be used to include credit unions, in this Note it
is used interchangeably with S&Ls.
' Watkins, supra note 3, at 138.
6 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993) (stating directors and officers can be held
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regarding the proper standard of care by which to evaluate the conduct
of S&L officers and directors in certain situations, and its conflicting
legislative history has resulted in costly litigation that may continue
unless this section is clarified.7
This Note begins by looking at the history of the S&L crisis. Part
II chronicles the history of officer and director liability.9 Part I explores
the conflicting congressional history behind FJRREA, especially
§ 1821(k)."0 Part IV examines the cases which have attempted to resolve
the unanswered questions presented by FIRREA." The Note then
concludes that Congress should revisit § 1821(k) to establish a uniform
negligence standard for use in all cases involving officers and directors
of federally insured financial institutions, which would thus spare the
taxpayers the high cost of litigating this issue time and time again.
I THE HISTORY OF THE S&L CIusis AND
THE QUESTiONS PRESENTED BY 1821(K)
America's S&L, or thrift, industry originated during the 1830s with
the establishment of the Oxford Provident Building and Loan association
in Frankfort, Pennsylvania. 3 The industry grew steadily throughout the
1800s and early 1900s, establishing itself as a provider of domestic
financial services. This growth pattern continued until the Great Depres-
sion, when over 1700 thrifts failed. 4 This industry-wide collapse
prompted Congress and the President to increase government regulation
of the nation's S&Ls with the hope of stabilizing and saving these
institutions." "The Great Depression spurred the reformation of the
thrift industry into a federally conceived and assisted system to provide
liable for gross negligence or intentional tortious conduct).
See infra notes 103-206 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 13-55 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 56-102 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 123-96 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
1' H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 290, 292 (1989), reprinted
in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N 86, 88; see also Lucia J. Mandarino, Note, Too Many Consonants
and Not Enough Consonance: The Development of the S&L Regulatory Framework, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. S263 (1991) (detailing the history of S&Ls in America).
14 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-54(I), supra note 13, at 292, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N at 88. These failures were due to borrowers' inability to service their
mortgages. Id.
15 Id.
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citizens with affordable housing funds. It is accurate to say that the
present thrift industry structure was born during the Depression."'
6
In 1932, Congress enacted the Federal Home Loan Bank Act,7
which authorized the creation of twelve district banks to lend money to
thrifts and established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB")
to oversee these district banks.'8 In the following year, Congress passed
the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933.9 This Act authorized the FHLBB
to grant federal S&L charters and established the Home Owner's Loan
Corporation ("HOLC") to purchase and refinance delinquent loans in
order to help home owners avoid foreclosure." Additional regulation
came with the passage of the National Housing Act of 1934," which
created the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") '
These measures enabled the thrift industry to rebound in the post-
Depression years and accumulate three percent of the country's total
financial assets by 1945." This growth continued over the years, and by
1985 thrifts held fifteen percent of America's assets.' Thrifts were also
responsible for originating forty-nine percent of all one-to-four family
mortgages nationwide in 1988 .0 These loans flowed from the congres-
sional regulatory plan to utilize S&Ls to increase the availability of
affordable housing through mortgage credit.26
'6 Id.
"Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1421-
1449 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995)). "The primary purpose of the Act was to rescue the
failed savings and loan industy by channeling cash to thrifts." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-
54(I), supra note 13, at 292, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. at 88.
' H.R. CONF. RE'. No. 101-54(1), supra note 13, at 292, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.CA.N at 88.
'9 Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (current version at 12 U.S.CA. §§ 1461-1470
(West 1989 & Supp. 1995)).
"" H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-54(1), supra note 13, at 293, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.CA.N at 89 ("Over its life, the HOLC refinanced $2.75 billion worth of home
mortgages, and invested $300 million in thrift institutions").
,a Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (current version at 12 U.S.CA. §§ 1701-1750
(West 1989 & Supp. 1995)).
2 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-54(l), supra note 13, at 293, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.CA.N at 89. The FSLIC insured thrift deposits up to $5000 in order to encourage
public re-investment in the savings and loan industry. The FHA provides insurance which
offers protection to mortgage lenders by guaranteeing the repayment of defaulted loans.
Id.
"nId.
' Id.
"' Id. at 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N at 87.
2Id. at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N at 90 ("[A] critical factor in achieving
1994-95]
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However, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the increase in
interest rates - following the Federal Reserve Board's decision to switch
from a policy of stabilizing interest rates to one focusing on controlling
the growth of the money supply - hit the thrift industry particularly
hard As one congressional report noted:
This shift caused a dramatic increase in interest rates with an equally
dramatic increase in the cost of funds at thrifts. At the same time, thrift
assets were locked into long-term, low-yielding, fixed-rate mortgages.
This meant thrifts were paying more to attract funds than they were
earning on their mortgage portfolios. This "negative" interest rate
mismatch was the beginning of the thrift crisis as we know Its
The government, both at the state" and federal level, attempted to
remedy this situation by rapidly deregulating the thrift industry and
allowing S&Ls to diversify their loan bases and other investments." In
addition, Congress endorsed the use of Regulatory Accounting Principles
("RAP"), which allow for the inclusion of certain speculative forms of
capital and the exclusion of certain liabilities, rather than insisting on the
use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") to track S&L
performance and regulatory compliance.3
This swift deregulation allowed many S&Ls to participate in high-risk
investment schemes and undergo rapid expansion without experiencing
any reduction of their liabilities or improvement in their actual overall
financial condition. 2 The use of RAP rather than GAAP to track the
the government's housing goal is the existence of a safe, efficient and viable thrift
industry.").2 7 1d. at 295, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N at 91.
2 Id.
' As of 1980, a little over half of the FSLIC-insured thrifts were state chartered and
thereby regulated primarily by state legislatures. By 1984, over one third of the states had
granted these state-chartered banks greater investment flexibility than that enjoyed by
federally chartered banks. Id. at 297, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CAN at 93.
30 See id. at 294-98, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CAN at 90-94. This section describes
the various measures passed by Congress in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These
measures included the phaseout of "Regulation Q," 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1994), which had
previously governed the amount of interest paid on deposits, and the enactment of the
Gain-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which eliminated interest restrictions on
money-market accounts and radically altered investment limitations that had been
previously imposed on S&Ls.
3' H.R. CONF. R.EP. No. 101-54(1), supra note 13, at 298, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.CA.N at 94.
32 Id. at 298-99, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 94-95.
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S&Ls magnified this problem." "By 1984, the difference between RAP
and GAAP net worth at S&L's stood at $9 billion. This meant that the
industry's capital position, or stated differently, its cushion to absorb
losses was overstated by $9 billion.... By 1986, the difference had
grown to $13.3 billion."M
In the late 1980s, the bubble burst, as at least one third of the nation's
S&Ls stood on the brink of insolvency and had become targets for
regulatory intervention." A congressional report in 1989 summarized the
crisis as follows:
The thrift industry and FSLIC are now in perilous financial
condition. The causes of this crisis can be traced to a number of factors:
poorly timed deregulation; the dismal performance of some thrift
managements; inadequate oversight, supervision and regulation by
government regulatory agencies and the Reagan Administration; a
regional economic collapse; radical deregulation by several large States;
and outright fraud and insider abuse. What emerges all too clearly is
that when the savings and loan industry was deregulated, the Reagan
Administration, the Congress, several State legislatures, the government
agencies assigned to supervise and examine these institutions, and the
thrifts themselves badly misjudged the extent of the underlying
problems 6
In response to this troubling situation, Congress passed FIRREA,37
which abolished the FSLIC and the FHLBB and transferred most of their
n Id.
4 Id.
35 Lary, supra note 3, at 24 ("[T]he thrift industry began to topple like a house of cards,
taking with it the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. (FSLIC), the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB), and the good nights' sleep of many thrift executives.").
3" H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-54(1), supra note 13, at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N
at 90; see MARTIN LOWY, HIGH ROLLERS: INSIDE THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE (1991)
(providing a general history of the S&L crisis with emphasis on the role of insiders); Robert J.
Laughlin, Note, Causes of the Savings andLoan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S301 (1991)
(discussing the numerous factors that contributed to the S&L crisis). See generally H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 101-54(1), supra note 13, at 294-306, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. at 90-102
(discussing in detail each of the factors listed in the quoted material).
" For general information regarding FIRREA's directives, see Michael P. Malloy,
Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itsel. Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of
Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 1117 (1989), and Anthony C. Providenti Jr.,
Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned- Statutory Overview of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S323
(1991).
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functions' and property to the FDIC. 9 In addition, FIRREA also created
the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS")4° and the Resolution Trust
Corporation ("RTC"Y to deal with the failed S&Ls.42 Since its inception
in August of 1989, the RTC has managed $458 billion in assets, and it holds
approximately $69 billion in additional assets for future sale.43 In addition,
the RTC has begun seeking recovery from accounting firms,4" as well as
from former officers and directors,4s of failed S&Ls for their alleged
misconduct during the S&L debacle.
Under FIRREA, the RTC may seek damages for mismanagement by
directors and officers of federally insured institutions' Section 1821(k)
states:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of,
or at the request or direction of the [Resolution Trust] Corporation, which
action is prosecuted wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation -
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased
from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conserva-
tor, or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased
from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in part by an
insured depository institution or its affiliate in connection with
assistance provided under section 1823 of this title,
3' FIRREA established the Federal Housing Finance Board to succeed the FHLBB
in supervising the Federal Home Loan Banks and ensuring that they "carry out their
housing finance mission." 12 U.S.C. § 1422a (Supp. V 1993).
9 Id. § 1437.
40 Id. § 1462a.
41 Id. § 1441a(b).
4 Id. The FDIC and the RTC share many powers under FIRREA, and many of the
statutory references in this Note refer to the RTC and the FDIC interchangeably.
4 Watkins, supra note 3, at 138-39.
4See generally John Pickering, RTC Set to Unlock Legal Floodgates; Resolution
Trust Corp. Cases From the Savings and Loan Crisis, Accr. TODAY, Apr. 6, 1992, at 1
(discussing RTC actions against the Big Six accounting firms for their alleged misconduct
during the S&L collapse, including claims for $154 million against KPMG Peat Marwick
and $319 million against Deloitte & Touche).
41 RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving an action against
former directors and officers of a federally insured thrift in receivership); RTC v.
Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving an action against former directors and
officers of a federally insured thrift in receivership).
"12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
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for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negli-
gence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined
and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph
shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applica-
ble law.4
Although at first glance it may appear that this section establishes a
generally applicable gross negligence standard of liability for officers and
directors of S&Ls," a closer analysis reveals such an application may
not be appropriate in all instances. First, § 1821(k) states that "[a] director
or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally
liable." 49 Some courts have found that "may" is a permissive rather than
a restrictive term,' and it should therefore not be construed to mean
"may only."5 Second, the final sentence of § 1821(k) preserves the
RTC's rights under "other applicable law," and one commentator has
argued this sentence clearly precludes the statute from having a preemp-
tive effect on the application of state negligence standards to directors and
officers of financial institutions. 2 The confusion over the congressional
intent behind this statute has forced courts to interpret the language of
§ 1821(k) in order to answer the following inquiries:
1) May the RTC impose a simple negligence standard of liability on
officers and directors of failed federally chartered S&Ls under the federal
common law? 3
47Id
' See generally David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under
FIRREA: A New Defense for Directors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions
- or a Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1703 (1992) (arguing that gross negligence is
the proper standard to apply to officers and directors).
49 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
" FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 446 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 516 (1992).
"' See RTC v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the use of
'may" in FIRREA provisions regarding the RTC's right to remove actions to a district
court to be permissive and not a bar to the use of other applicable venue rules).
52 See Jon Shepherd, Note, The Liability of Officers and Directors Under the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 90 MICH. L. REv.
1119, 1122 (1992) ("This portion of the statute suggests that section 1821(k) neither
promulgates a uniform standard of care nor preempts the FDIC's right to pursue actions
for simple negligence under state law.").
" See RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that § 1821(k)
establishes a standard of gross negligence for officers and directors of federally chartered
financial institutions and preempts application of any other federal common law); infra
1994-951
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2) May the RTC impose a simple negligence standard of liability on
officers and directors of failed state-chartered S&Ls under state law? 4
3) May the RTC impose a simple negligence standard of liability on
officers and directors of failed federally chartered S&Ls under state
law?
55
The decisions reached by the courts dealing with these issues are
largely conflicting and difficult to reconcile, a situation which points to
a need for congressional reform in the area of officer and director liability
under FIRREA. However, before turning to an analysis of the cases that
have interpreted § 1821(k), it is important to understand the traditional
rules regarding the liability of officers and directors and the congressional
history of the statute itself.
1I. THE HISTORY OF OFFICER AND DIRECTOR LIABILITY
A. The Traditional Rule
In 1891, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Briggs v.
Spaulding, addressed the issue of whether a group of bank directors could
be held liable for allowing a healthy bank to become insolvent over a six-
month period.' The plaintiffs alleged the directors had "utterly failed
to perform each and every of their official duties, and... [had] paid no
attention to the affairs of the bank."' In finding for the defendants, the
Court held the directors had not unreasonably relied on the officer that
was running the bank-" The Court then laid out the common law rule
notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
m See Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (holding that § 1821(k) establishes a baseline standard
of gross negligence but does not preempt imposition of a stricter standard under state law
upon officers and directors of state-chartered institutions); infra notes 151-73 and
accompanying text.
"' See RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that § 1821(k)
establishes a uniform standard of gross negligence for officers and directors of federally
chartered financial institutions and preempts any application of a stricter state standard
against them); infra notes 174-96 and accompanying text.
6 141 U.S. 132, 134-42 (1891).
' Id. at 137.
58 Id. at 160. The directors allowed bank officer Reuben Porter Lee to handle the
bank's affairs. Id. at 159. Lee worked for the bank for 14 years and held the positions of
"messenger boy, book-keeper, teller, assistant cashier, cashier, vice-president and
president." Id. at 158-59. He was the son of a well-known local citizen, the treasurer for
a leading church and the Young Men's Christian Association, and a member of the Young
Men's Association. Id. at 159. "His general character was good, his reputation for integrity
and financial capacity excellent, and he possessed the confidence of his fellow citizens."
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regarding the standard of care required of directors of financial institu-
tions:
[D]irectors must exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administra-
tion of the affairs of a bank, and... this includes something more than
officiating as figure-heads. They are entitled under the law to commit
the banking business, as defined, to their duly-authorized officers, but
this does not absolve them from the duty of reasonable supervision, nor
ought they to be permitted to be shielded from liability because of want
of knowledge of wrong-doing, if that ignorance is the result of gross
inattention59
Despite recently celebrating its 100th birthday, the Briggs decision
endures as the generally accepted rule regarding the liability standard for
directors of financial institutions.' However, it should be noted that
although the Briggs Court focused on the "gross inattention' aspect of
this rule in finding for the defendant directors,6 the mention of "ordi-
nary care" in this excerpt has complicated the application of this rule.'
For the most part, corporate officers and directors enjoy the protection
of the "business judgment rule."' 3 This rule, in deference to the difficul-
ty of making corporate decisions, establishes a presumption in favor of
officers and directors whose decisions are informed and made in good
faith." In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court described the
business judgment rule as "a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
Id.
5 Id. at 165-66.
See 3A WILLIAM FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COPORA-
TIONS § 1042.10, at 76 (1994) ('his is one of those unusual areas of law in which
contemporary courts are not bashful about citing and quoting century old authority."); see
also Fischer, supra note 48, at 1712 n.36, 1716 n.50 (noting that the Briggs approach has
enjoyed "marked durability" and has been "invoked faithfuily" with only minor variations).
't Briggs, 141 U.S. at 165-66.
6Z See Fischer, supra note 48, at 1717 n.53 (discussing the results of numerous cases
involving bank director liability).
'3See generally DENNIs J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUsINESs JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DuTI's OF CORPORATE DIREcORs (4th ed. 1993) (providing a comprehensive
treatment of the business judgment rule and the duties of corporate directors); Arthur F.
Mathews et al., Current Status of the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule,
C859 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 797 (1993) (discussing general provisions of the business judgment
rule and the duty of care for directors and officers).
Mathews et al., supra note 63, at 799.
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interests of the company."65 The Aronson court continued by stating that
"under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon
concepts of gross negligence.""
Officers and directors at financial institutions generally fall outside of
the scope of the business judgment rule and are "held to a stricter
accountability than the director[s] of an ordinary business corporation."
This statement is true for two reasons.' First, the business judgment
rule provides protection to officers and directors in regard to specific
decisions they reach. 9 However, parties bringing lawsuits against
officers and directors at financial institutions often seek to impose liability
for general mismanagement or failure to supervise without calling any
specific decision or action into question.70 Second, one of the major
- 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The American Law Institute has defined the
business judgment rule as follows:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the
duty under this Section if the director or officer.
(1) is not interested ... in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to
the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate
under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests
of the corporation.
AMERICAN LAW INSTrurTE, 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (1994); see also R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAw. 1337 (1993) (analyzing these and
other approaches to the business judgment rule).
"Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
' Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940). In Litwin, the court held
the directors of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York responsible for losses incurred
in a transaction in which the trust company agreed to buy certain bonds and give the
seller an option to repurchase them six months later at the same price. The court noted
this agreement placed all of the risk of loss on the trust company yet provided it with
little or no potential for profit. Id.
6 See 3A FLETCHER, supra note 60, at 77-78 (discussing the business judgment rule
and its application to bank directors).
' See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
7' Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 ("[I]t should be noted that the business judgment rule
operates only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where
directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to
act."); see also J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Liability of Corporate Directors for Negligence
in Permitting Mismanagement or Defalcations by Officers or Employees, 25 A.L.R.3d 941
(1969 & Supp. 1994) (citing cases that consider liability for directors' neglect of their
duties). But see FDIC v. Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing the
business judgment rule in a case involving allegations of improper supervision by bank
directors).
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policy reasons behind the business judgment rule is that business
operations involve risk, and generally bigger risks lead to larger
payoffs.7 However, because S&Ls and banks are closely regulated
depository institutions,' courts have more stringently reviewed risk-
taking by officers and directors of those institutions that are "charged
with responsibility for other people's money."73
Although bank officers and directors are generally denied the
protection of the business judgment rule, their reasonable reliance on
qualified managers has normally protected them from personal liabili-
ty.74 Accordingly, bank officers, along with the rest of the corporate
world, took notice when in 1985 the Delaware Supreme Court handed
down its landmark Van Gorkom decision in which the court appeared to
move away from the traditional approach to the liability of officers and
directors and the protection afforded them through reliance on representa-
tions made by a corporation's management personneL75
B. The Van Gorkom Scare
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, a group of shareholders of the Trans Union
Corporation ("Trans Union"), filed a class action lawsuit against its
chairman and chief executive officer, Jerome W. Van Gorkom, and the
rest of its board of directors.7' The shareholders sought damages from
7 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
(9 Fischer, supra note 48, at 1722 ("Beyond the common law, the federal and
state banking statutes impose on depository-institution directors many additional require-
ments and rigorous obligations that are unique to their industry") (footnotes omit-
ted).
' Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 896 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("A director of a bank is entrusted with the fimds of
depositors, and the stockholders look to him for protection from the imposition of
personal liability.").
7 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
7' Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). To understand the importance
of decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court regarding corporations, it is important to
note "Delaware ... is the principal architect and steward of a 'national corporation law'
since it is the domicile of over 180,000 corporations, many of which are major, national
public corporations .... Indeed, over half of the Fortune 500 companies are Delaware
corporations." E. Norman Veasey et al., The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues,
Strategies and Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAw. 865, 866 (1988).
76 488 A.2d at 863. At the time of the transaction at issue, Van Gorkom, a certified
public accountant and lawyer, had been on Trans Union's board for 24 years, its chief
1994-95]
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Van Gorkom and the rest of Trans Union's board for their alleged
misconduct in agreeing to certain provisions of an offer for a leveraged
buyout from Jay A. Pritzker, "a well-known corporate takeover special-
1st."
77
In 1980, Van Gorkom and Trans Union's senior management began
analyzing solutions to a recurring tax problem, 78 including possible sale
of the company.79 Trans Union's chief financial officer completed a
preliminary investigation of the potential for a leveraged buyout of Trans
Union and estimated "'$50 [a share] would be very easy to do but $60 [a
share] would be very difficult ... .""
Armed only with this preliminary information, Van Gorkom decided
to meet with Pritzker secretly."1 At their initial meeting, Van Gorkom
told Pritzker that he believed a leveraged buyout of Trans Union at $55
would be feasible.' Two days later, Pritzker told Van Gorkom he was
interested in purchasing at that price, and the two consented to the
deal. 3 However, Pritzker insisted that if Trans Union's board of direc-
tors did not approve the deal before the opening of the English stock
exchange three days later, his offer would be removed.'
executive officer for more than 17 years, and its chairman for two years. Id. at 865-66.
Id. at 866.
Trans Union was a publicly traded holding company with extensive dealings in the
railcar leasing industry, a business which produced large amounts of investment tax
credits. Id. at 864. Trans Union often had trouble generating sufficient taxable income
to fully utilize these credits. Id. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, it alleviated this
problem by acquiring small companies with outstanding taxable income. Id. at 864-65.
' Id. at 865. One other solution sought by Van Gork6m was a change in the tax law.
In the summer of 1980, he testified to and lobbied Congress to alter the investment tax
credit rules in order to allow companies like Trans Union to receive cash reflnds for
credits they did not have income to offset. Id. at 864-65.
80 Id. at 865 (quoting the chief financial officer).
"Id. at 866. Before the meeting, Van Gorkom asked Trans Union's controller to quietly
calculate the feasibility of a buyout of Trans Union at $55 per share. The choice of $55 was
apparently based solely on Van Gorkom's personal knowledge of the company and was not
supported by any actual evidence or study of Trans Union's intrinsic value. Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 867. Under the arrangement, Pritzker would agree to buy all outstand-
ing Trans Union shares at $55 per share, subject to the availability of financing. Id.
at 868. In return, Trans Union would be allowed to receive competing bids for 90
days, but it could not solicit the bids and only published information could be provid-
ed to bidders. In addition, Trans Union would agree that in the event the deal did not
materialize, it would sell Pritzker one million newly issued shares at $38 per share.
Id.
4 Id. at 867.
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Van Gorkom quickly called a board meeting to present the terms of
the proposed agreement to the board members. 5 Van Gorkom,s
attorney James Brennan s" Trans Union's chief financial officer," and
Trans Union's president 9 all spoke in favor of the proposal. Based on
these oral representations, the board accepted the terms of the agreement
after deliberating for less than two hours. 0
Not all of Trans Union's shareholders were happy with the arrange-
ment, and one shareholder, Alden Smith, filed a lawsuit to enjoin the
merger.9' After the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, Trans Union's shareholders approved the buyout agreement
with Pritzker.' However, Smith and another plaintiff, John W. Gosselin,
continued the lawsuit as representatives of a certified class of sharehold-
ers.
93
The Delaware Supreme Court held that Trans Union's directors were
not protected by the business judgment rule, even though their decision
was based on the representations of three experienced management per-
sonnel and an attorney who advised them they might be sued if they did
not accept the proposal.' The court summarized its decision as follows:
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van
Gorkom's role in forcing the "sale" of the Company and in establishing
the per share purchase price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic
85 Id. at 865.
s6 Van Gorkom gave a 20-minute oral presentation regarding the potential deal with
Pritzker and explained that it would put Trans Union "'up for auction' and allow the
"'free market ... [the] opportunity to judge whether $55 is a fair price."' Id. at 868.
"7 Brennan "advised the members of the Board that they might be sued if they failed
to accept the offer and that a fairness opinion was not required as a matter of law." Id.
s Trans Union's chief financial officer told the board he had not been previously
aware of Van Gorkom's actions, but that by his estimation $55 a share was "'inthe range
of a fair price,' but 'at the beginning of the range."' Id. at 869.
"9 The president spoke in support of Van Gorkom's representations and noted he
agreed with him regarding "'the necessity to act immediately on this offer,' and about 'the
adequacy of the $55 and the question of how that would be tested."' Id.
9 Id.
9' Id. at 864.
92 Id. The stockholders' vote was held on February 10, 1980, and 69.9% of the
outstanding shares were voted in favor of the deal while 7.25% were voted against it. The
remaining 22.85% of the shares were not voted. Id. at 870.
' Smith owned 54,000 shares of Trans Union stock, while Gosselin personally
owned 23,600 shares of Trans Union stock and his family owned another 20,000 shares.
Id. at 864.
94Id. at 893.
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value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a
minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the "sale" of the
Company upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and
without the exigency of a crisis or emergency?5
Although the Van Gorkom court couched its decision in terms of
"gross negligence," its refbsal to provide protection to directors that relied
on the representations of key management personnel "set off a storm [in
the corporate world, as many] feared that courts, with the advantage of
judicial hindsight, might soon begin second-guessing corporate directors
on all kinds of questions." 6 Increased premiums for director and officer
liability insurance policies soon reflected this uneasiness and uncertain-
tyY One report noted a 271% increase in insurance premiums for
officers and directors of banks and other financial institutions in just one
year.
98
To ensure that talented and qualified persons remained interested in
serving on corporate boards, many states began enacting statutes to
increase the legal protection afforded officers and directors.99 Indiana
was the first, enacting legislation in 1986 to absolve directors of liability
unless their behavior rose to the level of "willful misconduct or reckless-
ness."'"° Delaware soon followed with a slightly different approach
allowing corporations the option of adopting as part of their certificate of
incorporation
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach
of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not
eliminate or limit the liability of a director. (i) For any breach of the
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for
" Id. at 874; see also R. Link Newcomb, Note, The Limitation of Directors'
Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REv. 411, 418-29 (1987)
(providing an analysis of Van Gorkom and related decisions).
" Fischer, supra note 48, at 1738.
9 James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and
Officer Liability, Limitation and Indemnifcation, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1209 (1988)
(noting that as a result of Van Gorkom and other related cases, "the almost reflexive
deference of courts to boardroom decisions evaporated - and with it the predictability on
which directors and D&O [director and officer] insurance carriers have for so long
relied.").
Insuring Directors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1986, at 31.
Fischer, supra note 48, at 1738-40.
'00 IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(e) (1989).
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acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; ... or (iv) for any transac-
tion from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.''
By 1988, forty additional states had enacted some type of legislation
insulating officers and directors from personal liability for corporate
decisions.' 2 It was against this backdrop that Congress began the task
of drafting § 1821(k) and establishing the proper standard for imposing
personal liability on officers and directors of federally insured financial
institutions.
Ill. THE CoNGREssIoNAL HISTORY OF § 1821(K)
A. Senate Intent
Under pressure from the President to respond quickly to the S&L
crisis, FIRREA's supporters in the Senate set a tight schedule for the
bill's consideration with the hope of passing the measure unburdened by
amendments and excessive debate.' Despite this hectic timetable, one
issue that surfaced during the two-day debate over the bill was the
liability standard that should be imposed on officers and directors.
In its original form, the FIRREA section dealing with the liability of
officers and directors would have imposed personal liability for "any
cause of action available at common law, including, but not limited to,
negligence, gross negligence, willful misconduct, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, conversion, fraud, waste of corporate assets, and
violations of statutes."'" However, certain senators expressed concern
that such a strict liability standard would disrupt the public policy of
encouraging the best possible persons to serve on corporate boards. As
Senator Howell Heflin noted:
Federal regulatory officials constantly stress the need for effective and
honest board management. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency
101 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
'02 Hanks, supra note 97, at 1209. The Hanks article provides an in-depth look at the
various types of insulating statutes that were passed in the mid-1980s and analyzes the
potential implications for this nationwide move to limit the liability of officers and
directors. See also Shepherd, supra note 52, at 1120 n.7 (citing examples of 37 insulating
state statutes).
"' Fischer, supra note 48, at 1746-48 (discussing the push to complete consideration
of the 564-page measure in two days and the unhappiness of many senators in having to
vote on this important legislation in such a short time frame).
"4 S. 774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 214(n) (1989).
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has stated. "At the OCC we recognize the important contributions
knowledgeable and active directors make to the bank and the communi-
ty.... We want to support directors by ensuring that they have a clear
idea of what is expected of them.'
Therefore, without a clarifying amendment, financial institutions
may lose effective directors, maybe an entire board of directors.0 5
The concerns of Heflin and others led to an amendment of the section
that read as follows:
LIABILITY - A director or officer of an insured financial institution may
be held personally liable...
... for gross negligence or intentional tortious conduct, as those
terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing
in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right, if any, of the [FDIC]
that may have existed immediately prior to the enactment of the FIRRE
Act.1
06
Following this amendment, Senator Terry Sanford thanked the floor
managers for making these changes and stated:
I believe that these changes are essential if we are to attract
qualified officers and directors to serve in our financial institutions. The
bill as [first] drafted would have preempted numerous State laws which
provide limited indemnification for directors and officers. These State
laws were enacted largely in response to problems faced by corporations
in attracting good officers and directors ....
The amendment which the managers have accepted modifies the
bill to preempt State law only in a very limited capacity. The amend-
ment would permit the FDIC to bring an action ... if the director or
officer acted with gross negligence or committed an intentional tort.
107
Two months after the debates were completed and the measure
passed,0 8 the Senate released a section-by-section analysis regarding its
105 135 CONG. REC. S4238, S4264 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989).
'o6 Id. at S4318.
107 Id. at S4276-77.
" The Senate passed its original version of FIRREA by a vote of 91-8 on April 19,
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version of FIRREA.'" 9 The report stated that § 214(n) (the precursor of
§ 1821(k))
enables the FDIC to pursue claims against directors or officers of insured
financial institutions for gross negligence (or negligent conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care than gross negligence) or
for intentional tortious conduct. This right supersedes State law limitations
that, if applicable, would bar or impede such claims. This subsection does
not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under State law or under other
applicable Federal law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a
financial institution to be sued ... for violating a lower standard of care,
such as simple negligence .... "
Therefore, it appears that in enacting § 214(n), the Senate intended to
establish a "baseline' of liability for officers and directors. Under this
approach, any state statute passed in the wake of Van Gorkom to absolve
officers and directors from liability for gross negligence.' would be
neutralized by the language of FIRRA, but any applicable law imposing a
more stringent standard would remain in effect. Thus, an officer or director
could be held personally liable for 1) gross negligence or intentional tortious
conduct regardless of any insulating state statute, or 2) simple negligence if
a state or federal law more stringent than FIRREA were applicable to the
officer or director. This relatively straightforward approach to liability of
officers and directors under FIRREA did not last long. Just six weeks later,
the House Conference Committee, after making minor, non-substantive
changes to the section, expressed a different understanding of § 1821(k)'s
language in its section-by-section analysis."'
B. House Intent
The House, proceeding less rapidly than the Senate, passed its original
version of FIRREA on June 15, 1989."' Although the House altered the
1989. Id. at S4307.
" To explain why the section-by-section analysis of FIRREA was inserted into the
record on this late date, Senator Jake Gam noted: "Ordinarily, an analysis of this nature
would have been included in the committee's report, but due to the time pressure the
committee was operating under, an abbreviated report was issued in April. The
publication of this document... fills that gap." 135 CONG. REC. S6907, S6934 (daily ed.
June 19, 1989).
"' Id. at S6912 (emphasis added).
,. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
112 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 393, 398 (1989), reprinted
in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 437; see infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
113 135 CONG. REC. H2602 (daily ed. June 15, 1989).
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wording of the final sentence, or "savings clause," of the Senate's
§ 214(n),"' the change was not presented as substantive, and no
relevant debate took place in the House regarding this section." 5
However, in its section-by-section analysis of § 1821(k), the House
Conference Committee expressed an understanding of the liability of
officers and directors under FIRREA different from that presented in the
Senate's section-by-section report."6 According to the House report:
Title II preempts State law with respect to claims brought by the
FDIC in any capcity [sic] against officers or directors of an insured
depository institution. The preemption allows the FDIC to pursue claims
for gross negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a greater
disregard of a duty of care, including intentional tortious conduct.'
17
The language of the House report implies an intent to establish a uniform
liability standard for officers and directors of financial institutions which
would preempt the application of any other law, including a state law that
would impose a more stringent liability standard."" This position
conflicts with that of the Senate, which interpreted § 1821(k) to establish
a "baseline" for the liability of officers and directors to apply only when
a state's law had a more lenient standard than the FIRREA standard."9
Under the House's approach, officers or directors may be held personally
liable only for gross negligence or intentional tortious conduct.' 0
Hence, according to the House's interpretation of § 1821(k), a law
imposing a simple negligence standard would not apply.
Apparently, the Senate did not address the conflict between its view
and the House's view of § 1821(k) when considering the final version of
FIRREA' generated by the House Conference Committee.'2 These
114 See supra text accompanying note 110. This alteration became the final version
of § 1821(k). See supra text accompanying note 47.
... Fischer, supra note 48, at 1751 (discussing the House consideration of the Senate's
section regarding the liability of officers and directors under FIRREA).
" H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-222, supra note 112, at 398, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.N. at 437; see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
n1 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-222, supra note 112, at 398, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.CA.N. at 437.
11 Id.
19 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
'2 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-222, supra note 112, at 398, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.CA.N. at 437.
121 See 135 CONG. RaC. S9871-99 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989); see also Shepherd, supra
note 52, at 1133 ("If any senator believed that section 1821(k) as promulgated by the
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opposing views of § 1821(k) set the stage for later conflict. As one
commentator noted, "Unfortunately, neither the President nor the
Congress perceived that, in their haste to pass a comprehensive legislative
package, [Congress] had permitted FIRREA's key director-liability statute
to be drafted without clarity. The price of their negligence would be paid
by the taxpayers whom they had endeavored to spare.' '
IV. THE CASES ADDRESSING THE QUESTIONS
PRESENTED BY § 1821(K)
A. RTC v. Gallagher
In RTC v. Gallagher, the government filed a lawsuit against the
former officers and directors of the Concordia Federal Bank for Savings,
a federally chartered and insured thrift in receivership." In its com-
plaint, the RTC sought damages from the defendants for "negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence and breach of contract."'
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for a failure to
state a claim," arguing that § 1821(k) establishes a uniform gross
negligence standard for officers and directors that preempts the use of a
simple negligence standard.'26 The RTC countered by alleging that
Congress, by using "may" instead of "may only" in § 1821(k), did not
intend to displace the federal common law standard of liability.n7 In
addition, the RTC argued that § 1821(k)'s "savings clause" preserves
actions based on federal common law."" Accordingly, this case forced
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to resolve whether the language of
§ 1821(k) permits the imposition of a simple negligence standard of
liability on officers and directors of federally chartered S&Ls under
federal common law.
The Gallagher court discounted the RTC's "may" versus "may only"
argument by determining the word "may" was used in this section in
reference to the RTC's right to bring an action under the section."
House substantively changed the Senate's version of that section, the debate does not
show it.").
122 Fischer, supra note 48, at 1753.
12 10 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1993).
124 Id.
"2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
128 Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 418.
,' Id. at 420.
121 Id.
129 Id.
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Thus, the court held that "may" could not be read to modify the statute's
gross negligence standard and was thus irrelevant to the issue at
hand. 3' The court then turned its attention to § 1821(k)'s "savings
clause.' 31
The last sentence of § 1821(k) states: "Nothing in this paragraph shall
impair or affect any right of the corporation under other applicable
law."'' In Gallagher, the RTC argued that "other applicable law"
included federal common law and contended that it could hold officers
and directors liable for simple negligence under federal common law."
After considering the plain language of the statute," the legislative
history, 35 and the presumption that comprehensive regulatory programs
are intended to "occupy the field' 36 the court rejected the RTC's
argument.
37
In analyzing the language of § 1821(k), the court determined-
It is illogical that Congress intended in one sentence to establish a gross
negligence standard of liability and in the next sentence to eviscerate
that standard by allowing actions under federal common law for simple
negligence.
A better reading of the savings clause is that it was drafted to
preserve the RTC's ability to take other regulatory actions based on
simple negligence.'
In examining § 1821(k)'s legislative history, the court looked first at
the House Conference Committee report' "because it is the most
persuasive evidence of congressional intent besides the statute itself"'"
The court held that "the Conference Report shows that Congress intended
for officers and directors to be held liable 'forgross negligence ... ,'not
simple negligence.''. The court also discussed the conflicting section-
130 Id.
131 Id.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
1 Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 420.
13 Id. at 420-21.
131 Id. at 421-23.
136 Id. at 423-25.
131 Id. at 425.
. Id. at 420.
' See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
'40 Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 421.
141 Id. (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-222, supra note 112, at 398, reprinted in
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by-section analysis 42 and floor debate of the Senate,43 but it deter-
mined the legislative history "does not demonstrate the kind of 'clearly
expressed legislative intention' necessary to trump the plain meaning of
the statute."'" The court also noted subsequent attempts to alter
§ 1821(k)'s savings clause to specifically include simple negligence had
failed.
4 5
Finally, the court applied the U.S. Supreme Court's City ofMilwaukee
v. Illinois decision to the issue and found FIRREA, as a comprehensive
regulatory program, preempted application of federal common law.1"
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Court determined the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 "occupied the field through
the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by
an expert administrative agency."'47 Therefore, the Court found these
amendments preempted a federal common law nuisance action for
interstate water pollution.'" Analogously, the Gallagher court deter-
mined that FIRREA was a comprehensive regulatory scheme supervised
by an expert agency (the OTS), occupied the field in regard to the
liability of officers and directors, and therefore preempted the application
of federal common law."9 However, despite its resolution that federal
common law could not serve as a basis to impose simple negligence on
officers and directors of financial institutions, the Gallagher court
expressly reserved judgment on whether a state-based cause of action
might stand.
15
U.S.C.CA.N. at 437).
142 Id. at 421-22; see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
... Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 422-23; see supra notes 105-07 and accompanying
text.
4 Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 423 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)).
.4 Id. at 423. After FIRREA was passed, the FDIC unsuccessfully requested that
§ 1821(k) be amended to reintroduce a simple negligence standard. See Arthur W.
Leibold, Federal Common Law. What & Where?, in CIvIL & CaRwiNA LIABmnIY OF
OFcmS, Da croRs & PROFESSIONALS: BANK & THRiW LImGAnoN IN THE 1990's, at
153, 161 n.12 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4355,
1991). After this request was withdrawn, Representative Richard H. Baker also tried
unsuccessfilly to amend the savings clause of 1821(k). H.R. 3435, 102 Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 228 (1991).
Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 423-24 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981)).
147 451 U.S. at 317; see 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
'"451 U.S. at 317.
149 Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 424.
ISO Id. at 424-25. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of
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B. FDIC v. Canfield
In FDIC v. Canfield,' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the question expressly reserved by the Seventh Circuit in
Gallagher. The Canfield court decided that the RTC may impose a simple
negligence standard of liability on officers and directors of failed state-
chartered financial institutions under state law." In Canfield, the FDIC
brought a lawsuit against the officers and directors of the failed Tracy
Collins Bank & Trust Company under Utah law for alleged negligent
mismanagement.' Accepting the defendants' argument that § 1821(k)
preempted the application of state law to impose personal liability on
officers and directors, the district court dismissed the FDIC's com-
plaint."  However, the Tenth Circuit, sitting as a panel and later en
banc, reversed the district court and held the FDIC could pursue recovery
for negligence under Utah law.'55
In reaching its decision, the Canfield court relied on both the plain
language of § 1821(k)56 and its legislative history. The court first
determined that the use of "may," a permissive term, rather than "may
only" in the first sentence of § 1821(k) implied the section might be used
by the FDIC in situations where other applicable law imposed a standard
of liability more lenient than § 1821(k).' However, "[i]n states where
an officer or director is liable for simple negligence ... the FDIC may
rely, as it does in this case, on state law to enable its action." 59
The court then turned its attention to § 1821(k)'s "savings clause" and
found the clause supported the court's prior conclusion reached in the
"may" versus "may only" debate."6 The defendants argued the "other
applicable law" portion of the "savings clause" must be read to refer only
this issue.
15 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).152 Id. at 44445. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed this issue
regarding California law and reached the same result as the Tenth Circuit reached in
Canfield. FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 533 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2440 (1993).
13 Canfield, 967 F.2d at 444.
15 Id.
.. Id. at 445.
156 Id. at 445-48.
151 Id. at 44849.
" Id. at 446. For example, if the state law only held the officers and directors liable
for intentional conduct, the FDIC could still use the gross negligence standard. Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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to other sections of FIRREA in order to preserve the congressional
attempt to create a national standard of liability.16' The court rejected
this line of reasoning, stating:
The problem with this argument is that it limits the statutory language
by fiat. Nowhere does the statute announce its intention to create a
national standard of liability, and the vehemence of the assertions to the
contrary made by [the] defendants will not persuade us to interpret the
statute in light of a fiction."
Additionally, the court noted that § 1821(k)'s reliance on state law to
define gross negligence "directly refutes the proposition that FIRREA
establishes a national standard of liability for officers or directors.""
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that FIRREA
preempts the application of state law in this area by occupying the field:
In this case, the explicit preemptive language moves in only one
direction and its scope is explicitly limited. The statute blocks only
those state laws that require more than gross negligence in order to
establish the personal liability of directors and officers. By saving "other
applicable law," the statute makes unreasonable any inference that the
entire field was the target of the legislation."
The court supported this reading of § 1821(k) by discussing the Senate's
section-by-section report of the measure 65 which states that the section
does not preempt the imposition of a simple negligence standard to
officers or directors under any applicable law.' The court discounted
any argument that the House Conference Committee report"7 regarding
§ 1821(k) implied an intention to create a uniform liability standard,
holding: "The language of the [House Conference Committee] report
merely explains that the section allows actions for gross negligence. It is
thus consistent with the partial preemption interpretation of the stat-
rite.
, ,168
,' Id. at 447.
,Id.
16 Id.
'6' Id. at 448.
"6' See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
166 Canfield, 967 F.2d at 448.
'67 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
' Canfield, 967 F.2d at 448 n.6.
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Finally, the Canfield court noted that because FIRREA applies only
to troubled institutions, directors and officers in states with a simple
negligence standard would be encouraged to further weaken institutions
on the verge of failure.'69 Absent failure, they would be subject to a
simple negligence state standard, but following failure, a gross negligence
federal standard would apply.17° The court noted: "It cannot be that
FIRREA would indirectly encourage" officers and directors to further
weaken their institutions."'
With the Canfield court's resolution that a state-based simple
negligence standard may be imposed on officers and directors of a state-
chartered bank under § 1821(k)'7 and the Gallagher court's determina-
tion that simple negligence may not be imposed on officers and direc-
tors using federal common law under § 1821(k)," the question arose
as to which rule should apply to a federally chartered bank in a state
with a simple negligence standard of liability for officers and direc-
tors.
C. RTC v. Chapman
In RTC v. Chapman, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the issue raised by Canfield and Gallagher." The court ruled that
§ 1821(k) prevents the RTC from imposing a simple negligence liability
standard on officers and directors of federally chartered financial
institutions in those states which hold corporate officers and directors to
a simple negligence standard.175 Unfortunately, the two-to-one ruling
against the RTC raises as many questions as it answers. In the decision,
Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and Richard A. Posner took opposing views
on the issue. 7 ' The deadlock was broken by Judge Rovner, who stated
that while she was "sympathetic to the sentiments expressed by the
dissent" and shared many of Posner's concerns over Gallagher, the
unanimous decision in Gallagher forced her to side with Easterbrook.'"
16 Id. at 449.
'7o Id.
171 Id.
'7 See supra notes 151-71 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
'74 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
1 Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1124-25.
176 Easterbrook wrote the opinion of the court. Id. at 1121-25. Posner wrote the
dissenting opinion. Id. at 1125-28 (Posner, J., dissenting).
'77 Id. at 1125 (Rovner, J., concurring).
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In Chapman, the RTC filed a lawsuit against the officers and
directors of the Security Savings & Loan Association ("Security
Savings"), a 100-year-old, Illinois-based financial institution that
exchanged its state charter for a federal charter in 1982 and failed seven
years later.'78 In its complaint, the RTC alleged the officers and direc-
tors at Security Savings mismanaged the affairs of the institution and
violated their duty of care through simple negligence. 79 On appeal
from the district court's dismissal of the action based on the plead-
ings, '8 the RTC argued it could impose a simple negligence standard
against the defendants under Illinois law.' This standard could apply,
the RTC advocated, since the Gallagher decision expressly reserved
judgment on the issue of whether a state-based simple negligence cause
of action could lie against the officers and directors of a financial
institution under § 1821(k).'
In rejecting this argument, Easterbrook held that this case presented
a choice of law issue. Therefore, under the internal-affairs doctrine,
which holds that "internal corporate affairs are governed by the state of
incorporation,"'" the liability of officers and directors at federally
chartered institutions should be controlled by federal law. 8 Easterbrook
noted the court "concluded in Gallagher that this statute [§ 1821(k)]
adopts gross negligence as the rule for managers and directors of federal
financial institutions."'86 Accordingly, the RTC could not use Illinois
law to impose a simple negligence standard of liability on the officers and
directors of a federally chartered financial institution."
In dissent Posner attacked the majority's decision on two
grounds.'88 First, he contended Congress passed § 1821(k) with the
intent of establishing a baseline liability for officers and directors guilty
of gross negligence, not with the intent of "creating a new immunity for
"9 Id. at 1125 (Posner, J., dissenting).
'79 Id. at 1121.
'so Id.
... Id. at 1122; see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 131 N.E. 103, 105 (II.
1921) (holding that directors of financial institutions are liable to depositors and
stockholders when they fail to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the performance of
their duties).
18 Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
'' Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.
18 MODEL BusNEss CORP. ACT § 15.05, at 1632 (1988).
"'. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122-23.
"' Id at 1123.
"1 Id.
. Id. at 1125-28 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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directors of federal S & Ls by depriving the RTC of the benefit of state
laws that imposed higher duties on directors."'89 Posner further argued:
The purpose of section 1821(k), as the timing of the statute's
enactment and other features of its history make clear, was to place a
floor under the liability of directors of savings and loan associations,
which were falling like ninepins. . . .The saving clause [of § 1821(k)]
ensured that if a state went further than the federal statute, and punished
simple negligence by directors, the RTC could use state rather than
federal law.
Next, Posner contended the majority's application of the internal-
affairs doctrine was misguided. He argued the doctrine only creates
a presumption that can be "rebutted by reference to (among other things)
'justified expectations,' 'certainty,' and 'ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied.'"'n Posner determined that Illinois
law should apply under this approach, noting:
Security [Savings] had been an Illinois corporation for a century, and
nothing in... the statute under which it converted to a federal S & L
would have suggested that the liability of its directors or officers was
being altered by the change. . . . [In addition, t]his case well illustrates
the difficulty of determining the rule of decision if federal law, the law
of the chartering jurisdiction, is applied instead of the law of the
S & L's principal place of business. For it is far from clear that section
1821(k), rather than federal common law, is the place to find that rule
193
Finally, in comparison to the majority's decision, Posner argued
Gallagher was "riven by a similar paradox,"'' and he suggested the
court might consider rehearing it en banc" 5 In addition, he stated that
"[i]f Gallagher was decided erroneously, let us not compound the error
by misapplying the internal-affairs doctrine."'96
"8 Id. at 1126 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
'92 Id. at 1127 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr
OF LAWS § 309 (1971)).
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
' Id. (Posnser, J., dissenting).
'g Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1128 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion indicates, the negligence standard the
RTC may impose on former officers and directors of failed S&Ls is
unclear in many circumstances under § 1821(k). The plain language of
the statute is subject to two equally plausible interpretations: 1) § 1821(k)
establishes a baseline of liability at gross negligence for officers and
directors of federally insured financial institutions, but it does not bar the
application of a more stringent state standard, such as simple negli-
gence;97 or 2) § 1821(k) establishes a uniform gross negligence
standard for officers and directors of federally insured financial institu-
tions that preempts the application of a more stringent standard under any
other law.' 8
Unfortunately, the legislative history of § 1821(k) offers little help in
determining which of these two readings is the proper approach. The
relevant congressional history indicates the Senate'99 believed § 1821(k)
would have the former effect while the House' believed it would have
the latter.
The cases in which courts have struggled to resolve this discrepancy
are difficult to reconcile. In Gallagher, the court used the plain language
of § 1821(k), its legislative history, and the presumption that congressio-
nal regulatory programs are intended to "occupy the field" to conclude
that § 1821(k) preempts the application of a standard more stringent than
gross negligence."' Conversely, the Canfield court also used the plain
language of § 1821(k), its legislative history, and the presumption that
congressional regulatory programs are intended to "occupy the field" to
conclude that § 1821(k) establishes a baseline of liability for officers and
directors at gross negligence without preempting the possible application
of a more stringent state standard. 2 Finally, in Chapman, Judges
Easterbrook and Posner clashed over the use of the internal-affairs
doctrine in applying § 1821(k) to the officers and directors of a federally
chartered bank in a state with a simple negligence standard. 3 Two
'"See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
'"See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
'"See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
2" RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993); see supra notes 123-50 and
accompanying text.
FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 516
(1992); see supra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
m RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994); see supra notes 174-96 and
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members of the three-judge panel expressed concern over whether the
Gallagher court had properly interpreted congressional intent behind
§ 1821(k).20
4
As Gallagher, Canfield, and Chapman display, troublesome inconsis-
tencies exist in the rule regarding the liability of officers and directors
under FIRREA. These inconsistencies have led to extensive litigation that
is likely to continue unless § 1821(k) is clarified. Considering that
FIRREA was passed to strengthen the powers of federal regulators?
and to emphasize the public interest in maximizing recovery from
negligent directors and officers of financial institutions, § 1821(k) should
be revised to clearly establish a federal baseline of gross negligence for
assessing the liability of officers and directors. This baseline would still
allow the RTC to seek recovery under other, more exacting, applicable
state law. The argument that the RTC should be prevented from utilizing
an otherwise applicable state simple negligence standard conflicts with
FIRREA's objectives and is adverse to the important public policy of
maximizing the RTC's recovery from officers and directors of S&Ls.
As enacted, § 1821(k) has created as many problems as it has
resolved. Considering the magnitude of the S&L crisis2 6 and the
important role lawsuits against officers and directors will play in reaching
a resolution of this calamity, Congress should revisit § 1821(k) and adopt
a rule establishing a minimum gross negligence standard for officers and
directors that allows the RTC to seek recovery under more stringent
applicable state law. Such an approach would allow the government to
maximize recovery and avoid costly relitigation of this issue.
Christopher Tyson Gorman
accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 177, 194-96 and accompanying text.
205 In its report on FIRREA, the Joint Conference Committee stated-
The primary purposes of the bill are [among others]: ... (2) to improve the
supervision of savings associations by strengthening capital, accounting, and
other supervisory standards; ... (9) to strengthen the enforcement powers of
federal regulators of financial institutions; and (10) to strengthen the penalties
for defrauding or otherwise damaging financial institutions and their depository.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-222, supra note 112, at 393, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N.
at 432.
2 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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